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SUBJECT: EAP A/S KURT CAMPBELL DISCUSSES FUTENMA, POTUS
VISIT WITH MOFA DG UMEMOTO, MOD DG TAKAMIZAWA

REF: TOKYO 2534

Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Deputy Chief of Mission; reasons 1.4 (b/d)

SUMMARY

11. (S) In a November 5 meeting, EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell, joined by the Ambassador, stressed to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) North American Affairs Bureau Director General Umemoto the importance of ensuring a successful visit to Japan by the President and provided a five-point suggestion from the White House (para. 2). A/S Campbell and Umemoto agreed that both governments should manage press reports depicting strains in the U.S.-Japan Alliance and instead steer the press to cover broader aspects of the bilateral relationship. Umemoto said he had persuaded Foreign Minister Okada not to take up contentious nuclear issues during the President's visit, especially a no-first use policy. He noted that a U.S. assurance of extended deterrence, while appreciated, would not be necessary.

12. (C) Joined later by Ministry of Defense (MOD) Defense Policy Bureau Director General Takamizawa, Umemoto asserted that Okada was gradually accepting the notion that consolidation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma with Kadena Air Base was not feasible, yet continued to press on MOFA and MOD bureaucrats on whether the current plan to move Futenma to Camp Schwab could be implemented in light of political and environmental considerations. The two DGs acknowledged that the political situation in Okinawa was worse than before, but thought it was still possible to implement the agreed plan. A/S Campbell and the Ambassador underscored that issues like Futenma were not appropriate for the leaders' discussion. End Summary.

SUGGESTIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL POTUS VISIT

13. (S) EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell joined the

Ambassador in telling Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) North American Affairs Bureau Director General Kazuyoshi Umemoto on November 5 that the U.S. and Japanese governments must ensure a successful visit to Japan by President Obama. A/S Campbell provided DG Umemoto with the following suggestions, noting he had just received White House instructions:

-- i. Both sides needed to agree on language to use publicly when addressing contentious bilateral issues, such as the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), host nation support, East Asian Community, and others. Both governments should begin working immediately on language the President and Prime Minister would use during and following the President's visit.

-- ii. Publicly create a small group tasked with assisting our respective leaders in working out current and future contentious issues. The announcement of the group should be soon, with the first meeting immediately after the President's visit. The announcement could include language that the group, which on the U.S. side would include White House, State and Department of Defense representatives, was working at the behest of political leaders. The announcement should indicate that the group would expeditiously resolve issues surrounding Japan's review of the FRF. This would allow both leaders to point to a process that had been put in place, A/S Campbell said. DG Umemoto noted it would be hard to say who would be Japan's representatives in such small group. Under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership, MOFA and MOD officials, possibly himself and MOD Defense Policy Bureau DG Nobushige Takamizawa, would have had such role. Now, with a Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led

government, the Japanese membership was unclear. Umemoto urged that the announcement of the formation of this group should be made only after both governments had agreed on its composition and mandate.

-- iii. The President was aware of Prime Minister Hatoyama's efforts to provide additional support to Afghanistan and was very appreciative. If PM Hatoyama were to announce the initiative while the President was in Japan, the President would express appreciation as helpful to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. DG Umemoto said the DPJ wanted to offer a good package and the initial plan was for the Prime Minister to inform the President informally of these plans but the Hatoyama government was now planning to make an announcement prior to the visit to show that it was Japan's own initiative. Nonetheless, PM Hatoyama was planning to discuss the situation in Afghanistan during the meeting with the President, DG Umemoto said. A/S Campbell asked that the announcement be timed as closely to the President's visit as possible.

-- iv. There were some issues that the United States believed ought not to be raised, including the East Asian Community (EAC), host nation support, Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and Japanese refueling operations in the Indian Ocean. We should agree on a public message on these issues in advance. DG Umemoto said it would be strange if PM Hatoyama suddenly stopped talking about his EAC initiative. On the other hand, the Prime Minister would want to discuss it in a way that was in line with the U.S. position and that supported the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

-- v. A/S Campbell said that commemorating the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Alliance should be a highlight of the discussions in Japan. The Japanese government's suggestions on potential new areas of cooperation, such as missile defense, extended deterrence and cyber-security, however, should be rounded out by other, non-military areas of cooperation, such as cooperation on strengthening the global economy and climate change.

14. (C) A/S Campbell asserted that U.S. and Japan public affairs managers needed to work closely together to address press reporting that the Alliance is facing difficulties. These critical stories should be addressed directly, using a message that highlighted the process that had been put in place, the deep respect the two nations had for each other, the critical importance of the Alliance, and our shared optimism of the future. DG Umemoto agreed, adding that the message should go beyond realignment to show other areas of bilateral and global cooperation, including climate change, clean energy, public health, and nuclear disarmament. The goal was to highlight that the U.S.-Japan relationship was more than just Alliance issues. A/S Campbell said the message should also include Japan's role in the global economic recovery.

EXTENDED DETERRENCE COMMENT NOT CRUCIAL

15. (C) DG Umemoto said he had persuaded FM Okada "not to pick a fight" with the United States on nuclear issues, especially regarding negative security assurances and no-first use, during the President's visit. However, FM Okada was looking for ways to address areas of mutual interest, such as the Nuclear Security Summit and nuclear non-proliferation, Umemoto remarked. A/S Campbell asked if Japan would be looking for statement of assurance on extended deterrence by the President. DG Umemoto responded that the Japanese

government assumed the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence was unchanged. Moreover, the current political leadership in Japan was less focused on this issue compared to the previous administration. While PM Hatoyama would undoubtedly welcome a statement of assurance from the President during the meeting, it was not something the Japanese government was requesting, either during the meeting or in public comments. DG Umemoto assessed that the lack of a statement would not have a negative impact.

16. (C) Commenting on the DPJ's approach to this visit, DG Umemoto said the DPJ had a different style from the LDP and, moreover, believed it needed to highlight those differences. But overall, the DPJ wanted a successful visit, Umemoto remarked.

FM MORE AWARE THAT KADENA OPTION NOT FEASIBLE

17. (C) In a later part of the meeting joined by MOD Defense Policy Bureau DG Takamizawa, DG Umemoto said Foreign Minister Okada was increasingly cognizant that consolidation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma onto Kadena Air Base was not operationally feasible. Okada had not yet abandoned the idea, however, as he also questioned the feasibility of the current plan for moving Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab in light of political, budgetary, and environmental issues. Budgetary concerns on FRF were particularly problematic, as Minister-at-Large for Okinawan Affairs and Minister of Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation Maehara had pledged to reduce the number of large-scale and wasteful government infrastructure projects to free up public funds for government spending more directly relevant to voters' livelihood. Nevertheless, Umemoto said he hoped the Cabinet would "grudgingly" admit that the current plan was the only feasible option given Okada's small shift in view toward Futenma.

OKINAWANS LACKING DRIVE FOR FRF

18. (C) Responding to A/S Campbell's observation that even Okinawan officials who had previously supported the realignment plan had recently made negative comments on Futenma, Umemoto said he maintained hope as both

Okinawa Governor Nakaima and Nago City residents continued to favor FRF.

SHOULD FOCUS ON POSITIVE, REMAIN FIRM ON FRF

¶9. (C) A/S Campbell sought the two DGs' views on defining success for the President's visit to Japan. Umemoto responded that the U.S. message on the overall bilateral relationship should focus on the positive aspects, but should remain firm on Futenma. He pointed out that Japanese public misperception that the U.S. Government had flexibility on the issue would only galvanize Okinawan politicians to strengthen their opposition to the FRF. He also expressed concern that a large segment of the DPJ had groundless, unsubstantiated expectations that President Obama would empathize with the DPJ's political plight and change Washington's course on realignment and the FRF. DPJ members saw a natural ally in a Democratic U.S. Administration, especially the President, and believed that their common positions on several issues, such as nonproliferation and climate change, would lead the President to be more flexible on contentious issues such as the FRF.

¶10. (C) Takamizawa said he had recently briefed Hatoyama on DPRK issues and the Prime Minister was engaged and appeared to understand. He urged U.S. officials to discuss the

significance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance with Hatoyama in the context of North Korea and regional threats. A/S Campbell pointed out that technical issues like the FRF were not appropriate for the two leaders to discuss in a bilateral summit. The Ambassador also stressed that focusing on Futenma was not the right approach to take if Prime Minister Hatoyama valued a close relationship with the President

¶11. (U) This message was cleared by EAP staff.
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